

THE PRACTICE OF VOTE BUYING IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA IN 2019: CASE STUDY IN BELITUNG REGENCY

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ABSTRACT

Voting in elections is a phenomenon that continues to occur in Indonesian politics, especially since direct elections. People who are more familiar with the terms voting buying and money politics are increasingly frequent, especially in legislative elections. This study tries to answer the question of how much influence the sound purchase decision changes the voters in Belitung Regency. This research uses quantitative methods through a survey approach using the stratified random sampling method. The survey was conducted on 399 respondents in Belitung Regency. The results showed that voters believed that vote-buying would occur in the 2019 legislative elections along with a large percentage of voter trust. Their choices can influence voters if they are given goods or money. Patron-client relations or relations between candidates and voters occur in terms of vote buying, provision of services and personal activities, provision of goods, project money, election fraud, the appearance of identity and prospective fundraising.

KEYWORDS: *Legislative Election, Voter Behavior, Money Politics, Patron-Client Relations*

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INTRODUCTION

Attention to voting behaviour in Indonesia has increased since at least the last few decades, in line with the era of democratic transition which, among other things, was marked by the presence of free and secret elections. The 1999 legislative elections and the 2004 presidential elections were seen as a milestone that marked Indonesia's entry into the ranks of democratic countries (Bunted and Ufen, 2009; Tomsa, 2008).

Elections as a representation of democracy are important events that connect candidates with voters. Competition in winning public votes is done in various ways. Democratic methods are usually carried out by selling vision, mission, programs and prospective activities. Another way is to use a track record or track record that is good and can be seen and felt by the community as a wise choice in choosing the decisions taken. However, many candidates use dirty campaigns and use sound buying methods that are good for money or goods for potential voters.

Almost all political scientists agree that money politics is a dangerous and bad phenomenon for democracy that overrides the principle of honesty and fairness in elections. The presence of independent public opinion survey institutions contributed to the increasing attention to voting behaviour in Indonesia. Free general election requires a more scientific approach to know public opinion and the tendency for voting behaviour. Although it is more widely used for the sake of

winning elections and post-conflict local elections, the presence of public opinion survey institutions makes the concept of voting better known in the Indonesian political sphere. The term's popularity and electability are now vocabularies that are often heard in the context of political contestation in Indonesia.

The study of voter behaviour in Indonesia has been widely carried out, both during the new order (Mulkan, 1989, Ghaffar, 1992; Kristiadi, 1996) and after the new order (Taqwa, 2004; Liddle and SaifulMujani 2007 & 2010). But these studies do not seem to explicitly focus on discussing the relationship between voting behaviour and money politics. The study of voting behaviour generally studies how voters make choices in elections and the factors that influence election selection.

Based on previous references, the authors believe that it is important to conduct special studies regarding the relationship between voting and political behaviour. The indication of money politics as a serious threat to the continuation of quality democracy and clean governance needs to be studied in depth. Of the 118 democratic countries in the world, Indonesia is still considered a group country that has low transparency in managing election campaign funds (Ward, 2003).

The practice of money politics is based on two sub-variables, namely the understanding of money politics and voter experience related to money politics (Brusco et al., 2004; Schaffer, 2004; Vicente, 2007). It seems to follow the opinion of Woshinsky (2008) that the decision to choose in a political contest is ultimately determined by the experience and understanding of the voters themselves.

So far, the influence of money politics on electoral behaviour remains a puzzle (Kramon, 2009). For this reason, general elections are carried out freely and confidentially so that money or material giving cannot control voter choice politically (Stokes, 2005). However, another opinion states, the influence of money on political processes are different in each community, depending on the social and cultural characteristics of the community concerned (Schaffer, 2004).

The study of voting behavior in Indonesia is still limited to the context of regional head elections (Rifai, 2003; Bunte and Ufen, 2009, Nurdin, 2014; Putra; 2017; Yanti and Alamsyah, 2018) and only research conducted by the General Election Commission (KPU) West Bandung Regency (2014) which discussed money politics in legislative elections. As far as the author's deepening, the study of the relationship between money politics in legislative elections is not of particular concern to researchers.

Based on the description above, researchers tried to find answers to vote buying or money politics in the context of legislative elections in Indonesia by holding case studies in Belitung Regency.

METHODS

This study focuses on the study of the phenomenon of vote buying in legislative elections in Indonesia in 2019, especially in Belitung Regency. This research uses quantitative methods through a survey approach using the stratified random sampling method. The survey was conducted on 399 respondents, namely voters in Belitung Regency who were the object of the survey. Samples taken from this survey are based on the Slovin formula (in Sugiyono, 2010) for the population (the number of permanent voters in the 2019 Election), namely 125,200 people taken is a minimum of 399 respondents sampling error of 5%.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The term money politics in Indonesia is often used to describe the phenomenon of the round of money politics in the conduct of elections. That is, voters are expected to have more money to choose certain candidates, rather than seeing other indicators such as credibility, personality, and experience in political positions. In the context of elections, money politics actors can be involved with at least five actors who have different interests, namely; Voters, candidates, political parties, election administration, and funders (entrepreneurs, donors). Goods are exchanged both in cash and other materials to be exchanged for positions, policy decisions or politics.

In the context of elections, there are four circles of money politics - first, transactions between the economic elite (money owners) and regional head candidates. Second, transactions between regional head candidates and political parties have the right to nominate. This practice is summarized by Buehler and Tan (2007) as "those who undermine money from prospective candidates. Third, transactions between candidates and campaign teams with election officials who have the authority to count votes. The aim is to add beacons to illegal methods. Fourth, transactions between candidates or voters and campaigns with teams forming reasonable purchases. Candidates for contest participants or sharing money directly with potential voters in hopes of getting instant votes.

Schaffer (2002), said there were at least four types of motivation among voters why they accepted the offer of money politics. The first is short-term economic needs, and voters see the benefits immediately. Both are worried about possible retaliation if voters reject the offer of money politics. Third, related to the sense of their personal obligation to the broker (team success) is in money politics, usually consisting of people, friends, or family members. Fourth; The belief that money politics is a sign of virtue or proof of awareness of prospective voters. The third and fourth motives are an explanation of why money politics is often difficult to spend through citizenship education.

The variety of money politics offered or accepted by voters can generally be grouped into five types; (1) cash; (2) clothing and accessories (3) staple food and food assistance; (4) building materials such as cement, iron, bricks and the like; and (5) job offers. Whereas the actor or actor

In the context of Belitung Regency, since direct elections were held in 2004 until now, the problem of voting or money politics was the most occurring in 2019, during the presidential and legislative elections simultaneously. The survey was conducted before the legislative elections took place (April 17, 2019). The following are the results of a survey conducted by researchers:

Table 1: Voters' Expectations when Participating in the 2019 Belitung Regency Legislative Election Campaign

No	Information	Respondent	Percentage %
1	Vision, mission and work program	30	7.52%
2	Giving goods/gifts	237	59.40%
3	Giving money (money politics)	70	17.54%
4	Political Contract	21	5.26%
5	Entertainment (music)	31	7.77%
6	Photos (selfies) with legislative candidates	10	2.51%
Total		399	100%

Source: Survey results in Belitung Regency, April 2019

Based on table 1, it is known that the provision of goods/gifts amounted to 59.40% of the total respondents, giving money amounting to 17.54% of the total respondents, if combined, the amount is 76.94% of the total respondents.

Indications of buying votes with money and goods amounted to 76.94%. Potential changes in political voter elections in regional elections in Bandar Belitung in exchange for providing money and goods at 76.94%. Based on the results of the study, it was also found that the majority of respondents expected gifts from the legislative candidates, even candidates who gave more than the other candidates had the potential to be chosen.

The following presented in the survey results about the model of vote buying in the legislative election of Belitung Regency in 2019 in table 2 below:

Table 2: Model of Vote Buying in the Legislative Election of Belitung Regency in 2019

No	Information	Respondent	Percentage %
1	Direct vote buying (money politics)	142	35.59%
2	Giving goods by legislative candidates	169	42.36%
3	Services and activities of legislative candidates	8	2.00%
4	Programs funded by state money	17	4.26%
5	Election fraud	5	1.25%
6	Identity politics (based on religion and ethnicity)	5	1.25%
7	Fundraising by legislative candidates	40	10.02%
8	All happened (points 1-8)	13	3.26%
Total		399	100%

Source: Survey results in Belitung Regency, April 2019

Based on table 2, it is surprising that the provision of goods by legislative candidates was chosen by 42.36% of respondents, followed by direct voting (money politics) of 35.59%, and fundraising by legislative candidates at 10.02%. For respondents, the reason they chose the answer was their previous experience, where the provision of goods, money, and raising funds by candidates for community activities was very thick. This is considered as a rational choice by voters which only happens every five years, where the giving of goods and money from candidates will be converted into votes. Even though the money politics of the candidates is not very effective in getting support from voters (Muhtadi, 2018).

As Evans (2004) pointed out, rational voters are voters who make choices based on consideration of the optimal benefits to be obtained by voters. Rational voters make political calculations based on all the information they know about each party or candidate, before deciding who or which party to choose. Information about political parties or individual candidates can be obtained through mass media, campaign props, word of mouth information, and direct interaction with election candidates.

The rational choice model believes that a person's choosing behaviour is determined based on subjective evaluations of various conditions (economic-political-social) at the individual and community level. Usually, the principle of reward (punishment) and punishment (punishment) applies, especially to incumbent candidates. If the economic and social conditions are considered good, then voters tend to give awards by re-choosing candidates or ruling parties. Conversely, if the economic and social conditions are considered not good, then the voter will punish the candidate or the ruling party by voting for another candidate or party.

Subjective evaluation of these voters can be applied egocentrically (from the perspective experienced directly by the voters) and sociologically (assessment of macro conditions regionally and nationally). Rational choice models believe that economic factors have a decisive role in one's chosen behaviour. Therefore this model is often also called the economic voting model (Dorussen and Taylor, 2002).

According to Evans (2004), voters tend to choose parties and candidates on the basis of benefits obtained or promised. The expected benefits of voting will vary depending on the voter's background. However, some of the factors that motivate voters can be: benefits for the group (eg certain policies for the working class); material benefits (eg tax reduction); managerial competence (for example improving the quality of public services); focus on relevant issues (eg environmental policies to reduce pollution); and the defeat of others (for example, choosing a Conservative party to detain a Socialist party that is hated by voters).

Previous experts believed that choosing would consider the benefits of being objective in making their choices. The objective benefits in question are benefits for the general public or at least for groups. Commitments or promises to these voting groups also colour Indonesian politics. Each party or candidate not only gives policy or program commitments to the community or group but also commitments or incentives to individuals. This habit is thought to originate from elections in the New Order era, in which election participants distributed money in envelopes a few hours before the vote. Because it is usually done the night before dawn, the practice of distributing cash in envelopes is known as the "dawn attack". It is estimated that from the practice of the New Order elections, the origin of money politics in Indonesia originated.

The custom of parties or candidates participating in elections to provide material incentives to individuals continued in elections after the New Order. Much more frequency of elections (legislative elections, presidential elections, and post-conflict local elections; compared to the New Order which only once in five years) is thought to make the habit of providing material incentives to voters increasingly considered natural. Repeated practices from elections to elections ultimately make our voters tend to be more pragmatic, namely voters who consider personal benefits or benefits as a basis for determining their political choices.

However, material incentives are considered not the only variable considered by pragmatic voters. The fact is that so far no individual party or candidate has been proven to be able to obtain significant vote support in post-conflict local elections or elections, without conducting meaningful campaign activities to reach voters. In dropping their choices, pragmatic voters are assumed to also consider other variables such as candidate popularity and campaign problems. This assumption makes pragmatic voters have rational characteristics in determining their political choices. Such voters can be called rational-pragmatic voters, namely voters who in dropping their political choices consider several factors including the benefits of an individual material.

To get a picture of rational-pragmatic voter behaviour, a survey of voting behaviour with money politics must take place after voters cast their votes, both in elections and post-conflict local elections. Many researchers in Indonesia have not conducted surveys like this.

CONCLUSIONS

Money politics takes place in general elections in Indonesia, especially in legislative elections in Belitung Regency in 2019, caused by several factors. First, public or voter understanding of the practice of money politics is unclear; vote buying is understood differently by political actors. Second, habits, candidates for legislators who will fight bring gifts or souvenirs to voters who are considered as a courtesy and are also considered as habits and traditions rather than something contrary to ethics and law. Third, because of the decline in the level of public trust in elections, political parties and candidates. This distrust encourages them to be more pragmatic towards the political process, so expect

something in return for the political support they are given.

The most important factor is the low socio-economic status; regions with low-income populations are usually the target of vote-buying practices. In the case of Belitung Regency, the voters' socio-economic status that was still low influenced their political shift in voting in exchange for money or goods. Their choices can influence voters if they are given supplies or money. Relations between candidate patron clients and voters occur in cases of purchasing, administration, personal services and activities, provision of groups of goods, project money, election fraud, the appearance of identity and prospective fundraising.

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